

# **GCERF Investment Strategy for Indonesia**

## **2024 – 2028**

(4 years)

This document is guided by:

- GCERF’s original Strategy to Engage Communities and Address the Drivers of Violent Extremism (2017- 2020) and Updated Strategy for 2021 – 2025
- GCERF Governance Board decision ED.08.23/DEC.01 Approving Indonesia as a new partner country on 03/08/2023.
- The Republic Of Indonesia National Action Plan For Preventing And Countering Violent Extremism That Leads To Terrorism 2020–2024
- In-depth consultations with the Government of Indonesia, including the National Counter-Terrorism Agency or BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme)
- Consultations with representatives of Indonesian civil society
- Consultations with national and international donors working on P/CVE-related programmes in Indonesia
- Consultations with representatives of GCERF donors
- Consultations with the United Nations
- Additional desk research on Indonesia, including research and reports on good practices

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## Acronyms

BNPT	National Counter Terrorism Agency
CBI	Community Based Integration
CNA	Country Needs Assessment
CoP	Communities of Practice
CSM	Country Support Mechanism
CSM	Country Support Mechanism
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
Densus 88	Indonesian Police Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror
GCERF	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
HTI	Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IO	International organisation
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Conflict areas
JAD	Jamaah Ansharut Daulah
JAS	Jamaah Ansharu Syari'ah
JI	Jamaah Islamiyah
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAP	National Action Plan (RAN-PE)
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia)
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Islamic Organization)
P/CVE	Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism
Pesantren	Islamic Boarding Schools
PR	Principal Recipient
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
R&R	Rehabilitation & Reintegration
RAP-VE	Regional Action Plan-VE
RF	Results Framework
RFP	Request for Proposal
SR	Sub-recipient
ToC	Theory of Change
TPM	Third Party Monitoring
VE	Violent Extremism
WNT	West Nusa Tenggara
YPP	Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian

## **Executive Summary**

The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) sets its intention to enact the Country Investment Strategy in Indonesia to support the Republic of Indonesia’s National Programme in preventing and countering violent extremism. The Investment Strategy is guided by the principles of complementing the existing programming in the country, responding to gender and conflict sensitivities, seeking durable solutions, and aligning with internationally recognised good practices.

GCERF will invest in preventing violent extremism work in communities at-risk and provide them with support in much needed activities around social cohesion and more equal access to economic and social opportunities. The Investment Strategy puts its priority in improving the programme in rehabilitation and reintegration of people returning from conflict areas, preventing others from becoming radicalised and supporting the probation service.

Geographically, GCERF’s support will focus on the West Nusa Tenggara, Central Sulawesi, and Jakarta (Handayani Rehabilitation Center) regions because of vulnerability to extremism, and ongoing struggles over management of religiously influential and important sites like places of worship. According to the GCERF Country Needs Assessment’s findings and to prioritisation of Indonesia’s National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), these are the regions that are the most vulnerable socially, economically, and politically. The investment scenarios demonstrate how GCERF will approach them with a gradual investment.

GCERF will support the following activities:

- I. To support rehabilitation and reintegration of VE groups returnees and former detainees charged with extremism through building an enabling environment (policy framework and capacity building of frontline workers and community leaders)
- II. To promote community-based (re)integration for returnees and their families, bridging them with the host communities, through social cohesion and economic alternatives interventions
- III. To raise awareness against online and in-person radicalisation, promoting critical thinking and digital literacy in formal, informal and religious educational institutions.
- IV. To enhance the role of women in PCVE in promoting social cohesion resilience through support to female leaders at the community level
- V. To increase access to economic opportunities for daily labour workers, small traders, returning migrant workers, and people from vulnerable or stigmatised neighbourhoods

Table 1 below outlines GCERF’s proposed approach:

**WHAT: Enabling prevention and resilience-building of different groups against VE by building vertical social cohesion through 1) community-based integration of returnees and former VE offenders, 2) community agency development, and 3) alternative economic capacitation**

<b>WHO</b>	<b>WHERE</b>
<p><b>1) Youth between the ages of 15 and 30<sup>1</sup></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• West Nusa Tenggara: University Students</li> <li>• Students of Islamic Boarding Schools</li> <li>• Central Sulawesi: Teenagers between the ages of 15 and 18, especially the ones belonging to former VE fighters’ families.</li> </ul> <p><b>2) Remote, Isolated, Economically &amp; Socially Vulnerable Groups</b> (Unemployed males and females aged between 15 and 30)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• West Nusa Tenggara</li> <li>• Central Sulawesi</li> </ul> <p><b>3) Returnees &amp; Former Violent Extremist Offenders</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jakarta: Handayani Rehabilitation Center</li> <li>• West Nusa Tenggara</li> <li>• Central Sulawesi</li> </ul> <p><b>4) Supporting structures for rehabilitation and integration</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frontline workers (psychologists, social workers)</li> <li>• Members of formal educational institutions</li> <li>• Local authorities</li> <li>• Developing standard operating procedures</li> </ul> <p><b>4) Female Community and Religious Leaders</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Central Sulawesi</li> <li>• West Nusa Tenggara:</li> </ul>	<p><b>a. West Nusa Tenggara</b> <b>Cities/Regencies:</b> Mataram City, Bima City, Bima Regency, Lombok Barat Regency, Lombok Timur Regency</p> <p><b>b. Central Sulawesi</b> <b>Cities/Regencies::</b> Poso Regency, Morowali Regency</p> <p><b>c. Jakarta:</b> Handayani Rehabilitation Centre</p>

**HOW: Providing grants to Indonesian CSOs to prevent violent extremism, supporting rehabilitation and reintegration of people returning from Conflict areas, supporting integration of people released from prison, and addressing online and offline radicalisation in formal and informal educational institutions**

<sup>1</sup> According to Indonesia’s 2009 Law No. 40 on Youth, young people are citizens aged 16–30 years. According to the National Census of 2010, there are 65 million young people in Indonesia, representing 28 percent of the total population of 238 million (UNFPA, Indonesian Youth in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Nicholas Goodwin & Irma Martam, [Indonesian Youth in the 21st Century \(Youth Mapping\).pdf \(unfpa.org\)](#), 2014). We are adding the 15–18 age group here to include teenagers at risk of recruitment.

## 1. Guiding Principles

The following principles will guide GCERF's investment in Indonesia:

- Complementing efforts of other international organisations and aid agencies such as the United Nations in their efforts to support Indonesian communities in resilience-building and returnees in rehabilitation and reintegration;
- Planning gender responsive, intersectional programming;<sup>2</sup>
- Heeding conflict sensitive approaches that follow the Do No Harm<sup>3</sup> principle to identify potential negative consequences, taking steps to prevent them whenever possible, and proposing corrective actions when necessary;<sup>4</sup>
- Ensuring that programming contributes to and is aligned with good practices and recommendations of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and other key actors in the P/CVE space;<sup>5</sup>
- Meeting the requirements of the principles of providing 1) Durable solutions without harm, 2) Access to effective remedies, and 3) Co-operation and monitoring as fundamental principles of return by OSCE;<sup>6</sup>
- Contributing to the implementation of principles on rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees according to the Madrid Guiding Principles by the United Nations Security Council Counterterrorism Committee<sup>7</sup> and in line with the GCERF Approach to Rehabilitation & Reintegration.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> [Global Counter-Terrorism Forum. The Gender and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Policy Toolkit. GCTF, 2022](#)

<sup>3</sup> [Do No Harm | Peacebuilding & Conflict Sensitivity | World Vision International \(wvi.org\)](#)

<sup>4</sup> GCERF's Approach to Conflict Sensitive Programming

<sup>5</sup> Including: Memorandum on Good Practices in Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in Preventing Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism (2020); Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (2016) and its addendum (2020); The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon (2016) and its addendum (2020); Good Practices on Addressing the Challenge of Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (2018).

<sup>6</sup> Guiding Principles on Human Rights in the Return of Trafficked Persons, OSCE, 2014.

<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/8/124268.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> Madrid Guiding Principles, UNSC CTC, 2015.

[https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Jan/madrid-guiding-principles\\_en.pdf](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Jan/madrid-guiding-principles_en.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> [GCERF's Approach to Rehabilitation & Reintegration](#)

## **2. GCERF Positioning**

### **Rationale**

#### **I. An enduring threat since 2000**

Indonesia is currently ranked 31<sup>st</sup> on the 2024 Global Terrorism Index. However, some different types of violent extremism endure:

**1. International terrorism:** Early attacks included the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, the 2001 Atrium Mall bombing, the 2002 Bali bombings, and the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing. One faction later formed its own independent cell, called al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago, which carried out the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing, the 2005 Bali bombings and the 2009 Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotel bombings. The first Bali bombings of 12 October 2002 in particular triggered a strong response from Indonesian security agencies who conducted over three hundred arrests over the ensuing three years<sup>9</sup>.

After several years marked by an absence of large-scale terrorist incidents, 2016 saw the beginning of a new level of threat in Indonesia. Militants inspired by ISIS and often affiliated with JAD conducted a series of attacks against police forces and civilians (especially Christians) in Jakarta (January 2016); Samarinda (November 2016); Jakarta (May 2017); Medan and Jakarta (June 2017); and a Depok detention facility, Surabaya, and Riau (May 2018)<sup>10</sup>. Even though no terrorist attacks occurred in Indonesia in 2023, violent extremist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and ISIL remain active in carrying out their underground activities, such as propagating their narratives, recruiting new members, preparing attacks and collecting funds. The arrest of several individuals linked to those groups by the Indonesian Police in 2022 and 2023 revealed those activities.

**2. A multi-generational militant Islamist movement** – the Jamaah Islamiyah’s Network – that has long sought foreign assistance and inspiration but has its own goals and unique roots in the nation’s fight for independence. From 2009–2019, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) entered a rebuilding phase, in which emphasis was placed on a gradual, methodical strengthening of the social, economic, and political pre-conditions for an eventual armed jihad campaign to forcibly establish an Indonesian Islamic State<sup>11</sup>. Under the leadership of Para Wijayanto, JI grew both in terms of membership and

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<sup>9</sup> Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia, Barton, Vergani, Wahid, 2022.

<sup>10</sup> Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia, Barton, Vergani, Wahid, 2022.

<sup>11</sup> [Jemaah Islamiyah 20 Years After the Bali Bombings: Continuity and Change – RSIS](#)



wealth. Authorities estimated that during his time in charge, the network had 6,000 active members and was able to raise millions of dollars from charities<sup>12</sup>. Although its presence is weakening, it is detected that JI continues to try maintaining networks within the society<sup>13</sup>. In addition, the groups affiliated with ISIL are operating similarly. The target areas for intervention on GCERF's intervention are vulnerable to the influence of those groups

**3. Indonesians fighting abroad:** Hundreds of Indonesians responded to the call of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to join them in Conflict areas. Currently, some Indonesians are in Syrian camps – mainly women and children. Since 2020, the Coordinating Minister has adopted a decree of establishing a Task Force for Handling Indonesian FTFs, and in 2023 the Task Force was altered to the Task Force for Handling Indonesian Citizen Abroad Associated with Foreign Terrorist Fighters. Its main task is to prepare operation stages covering “before, at, and after border”, which includes efforts of rehabilitation and social reintegration for the FTF and their Family members. The Task Force is chaired by Head of BNPT and its members consist of 15 Ministries/Agencies. However as of date, no Indonesians have been returned from the two camps in Northeast of Syria.

## **II. Drivers and characteristics of Terrorism in Indonesia**

### **1. Ideological Drivers**

VE in Indonesia is largely driven by violent ideology using religious sentiment. Data from the Indonesian Knowledge Hub (I-K-Hub) on CVE suggests that most attacks are driven by ideology<sup>14</sup>. These ideological factors are often extreme interpretations of religious teachings resulting in intolerant attitudes towards others. Research by social psychologists of terrorist inmates concluded that belief systems were driving factors behind their actions (Sarwono 2012).

### **2. Poverty & Economic Exclusion**

The relationship between poverty and VE is well documented globally. Challenging living conditions and economic exclusion can fuel grievances, exacerbate social and religious differences, and result in a dissatisfaction with the status quo which can be exploited by extremist groups. The 2022 National Survey on VE in Indonesia found a statistically significant correlation between support for VE and relative deprivation. The

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<sup>12</sup> [‘Quietly infiltrating public institutions’: 20 years after Bali bombings, Jemaah Islamiyah threat remains – CNA \(channelnewsasia.com\)](https://www.cna.com/stories/quietly-infiltrating-public-institutions-20-years-after-bali-bombings-jemaah-islamiyah-threat-remains)

<sup>13</sup> [Jemaah Islamiyah \(nationalsecurity.gov.au\)](https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/jemaah-islamiyah)

<sup>14</sup> [https://ikhub.id/produk?type=kasus\\_motif](https://ikhub.id/produk?type=kasus_motif)

survey found not only that 30% of Muslim respondents believed the financial status of their fellow Muslims were less than that of their non-Muslim counterparts, but also that these feelings are associated with support for extremism. In most cases, extremist organisations target economically vulnerable groups and use economic power to exert influence.

### **3. Political & Regional Tensions**

For consecutive elections – in the 2014 and 2019 general elections and in the 2017 regional head election of DKI<sup>15</sup> Jakarta – Indonesia has experienced polarising identity politics with a widespread impact on public discourse and community relations (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2019).

However, VE and terrorist groups in Indonesia are also ideologically opposed to democracy itself (as a man-made law and system). They capitalise on polarisation and controversies to recruit those who are politically or economically alienated. Examples of this are found in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, where reports suggest the refusal of some radicalised communities, influenced by extremist groups, to vote or see peaceful political processes as solutions to conflict (Fauzi, Rafsadie, and Mulyartono 2019).

### **4. Gaps of Moderate Religious Organisations**

In general, the presence of large moderate Muslim organisations (Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)) serves as a bulwark against the spread of radical ideas and VE. However, radical groups look to step in areas where these organisations have gaps or deficiencies.

Many people radicalised by Islamic State and some of those subsequently returning – or their family members – come from wealthy or urban backgrounds. Gaps in formal religious education, or a lack of updating for newer generations (i.e. failure to understand students/young people’s agency, personal narratives, and aspirations) has allowed opportunities for informal religious education to step in and fill this void (Ikhwan, Kailani, and Isnaini 2021, p.2). Some of these informal channels can lead to radical content or networks and are present in university campuses as well as online.

### **5. Online radicalisation**

Online radicalisation in Indonesia has become increasingly common. Social media has accelerated the traditional recruitment and radicalisation processes and is helping

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<sup>15</sup> Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta – Special Capital Region of Jakarta, abbreviated to DKI Jakarta.

violent extremist (VE) organisations like IS to avoid government crackdowns, which have increased in recent years. Reports<sup>16</sup> have identified young people (university students, high-school students, and former juvenile offenders) and particularly women among them, having limited critical thinking and digital literacy skills to protect themselves against violent extremist content. Therefore, Digital PVE is becoming an increasingly important component of prevention work. It is critical that CSOs engage in supporting critical thinking and digital literacy skills. GCERF has a wealth of experience in supporting both critical thinking and digital literacy skills among vulnerable youth in Bangladesh, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. In these countries, GCERF provided capacity strengthening support to engage youths, religious leaders and local communities to promote peaceful and tolerant messaging.

#### **6. Lack of economic opportunities**

A lack of economic opportunities can contribute to the decision of people including youth to join non-state armed groups including Violent Extremist (VE) and terrorist groups. By providing livelihood opportunities, market-driven skills, and tools especially where recruitment is rampant, resilience and meaningful alternatives can be created. GCERF's experience in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and in some African countries has helped GCERF to learn how to collaborate with humanitarian and UN agencies in livelihood support, which is critical in some location affected by VE in the Indonesian context.

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<sup>16</sup> Social Media Use Needs Assessment for At-Risk Groups & In-Depth Analysis of Use of Social Media in Indonesia, Search for Common Ground Report, 2018. [https://documents.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/SFCG\\_INA034\\_SMNA\\_Report\\_FINAL-2019.pdf](https://documents.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/SFCG_INA034_SMNA_Report_FINAL-2019.pdf)

### **3. GCERF Added Value**

As an apolitical global fund, GCERF currently supports national governments and local communities in 22 countries across three continents to enable effective PVE responses. Its programming has generated a wealth of expertise, lessons learned, and the development of effective practices. This spans the P/CVE spectrum, and this knowledge is shared with all partners through Regional and Global Communities of Practice and the Global Action Platform (GAP). Following its Global Capacity Strengthening Guideline along with local authority actors, and the Country Support Mechanism (CSM) as required, GCERF provides extensive support and capacity building to local partners, including small Community Based Organisations (CBOs) with existing relationships in marginalised communities, using a consortium-based approach.

GCERF also brings five years of experience in providing rehabilitation and reintegration support for local civil society organisations in coordination with national government counterparts. The investment in Indonesia will complement ongoing efforts by other entities such as UNODC, UNCT, and local and international NGOs in this space, contributing to the overall efforts of the government, especially the Ministry of Social Affairs. Specifically, the GAP, comprising all current and past GCERF grantees (over 350 grassroots and community-based organisations), will share their experiences and expertise in this space with Indonesian actors. Two of the working groups, the Community Based Integration and Supporting People Returning from Conflict areas, have accumulated tremendous expertise that may be relevant or adaptable in the Indonesian context.

In Albania, for example, GCERF supported efforts to revise the National Strategy and develop an Action Plan on R&R and P/CVE, as well as the development of Standard Operating Procedures on R&R and the building of capacity for central-level R&R actors at the national level. At the municipal level, GCERF partners developed guidelines for local authorities on R&R and capacity building. At the community level, GCERF enabled the reduction of stigmatisation towards returnees and provided access to a free counselling line for PVE and R&R related issues. Individual returnees receive medical, psycho-social, educational, administrative, and livelihood support.

Based on consultations with Indonesian counterparts, these services and support are among the top priorities for Indonesia. With the additional support provided by the UN and other international cooperation partners, GCERF and its partners have a real opportunity to add value in P/CVE initiatives, rehabilitation and reintegration programming for returnees, and probation services for individuals released from prisons.

### **Lessons Learned and Good Practices**

The last five years of rehabilitation and reintegration programming in GCERF partner countries have been monitored both quantitatively and qualitatively through rigorous monthly activity monitoring by our local national advisors, quarterly monitoring by the Secretariat, external mid-line and end-line evaluations, and third-party monitoring. Some of the main findings and lessons that we have gathered from funding projects in the area are as follows:

- ❖ **P/CVE is a long-term investment.** All the main objectives for GCERF’s engagement in Indonesia are multi-year initiatives. Therefore, the first round of investment is divided up in-between R&R, the creation of an enabling environment to prevent violent extremism, and supporting individuals released from prison work. The initial engagement is planned for 48 months in Indonesia (this is inclusive of the set-up phase).
- ❖ **Rehabilitation and Reintegration work needs to be complemented with PVE work.** R&R initiatives may be less effective or even counter-productive if they are not done in tandem with PVE activities. PVE efforts ensure that continued drivers that led people to join VE and terrorist groups in the first place are being addressed to avoid re-radicalisation or radicalisation to VE of others. In addition, PVE efforts are necessary to ensure an enabling environment for the (re)integration of returnees (children and youth) into their communities.
- ❖ **There is a need to do more work around mental health and psycho-social support for returnees as well as frontline workers (psychologists, social workers, teachers, and municipal workers, who engage with returnees).** Although the returnees go through psychosocial support at the transit centres during the initial rehabilitation phase, further support is much needed once they get to communities. Moreover, those who directly engage with returnees also require psychosocial support.
- ❖ **In a context of limited economic opportunities, addressing structural risk factors such as poverty and unemployment is an effective way to prevent violent extremism.** With increasing research suggesting a strong link between economic vulnerability and recruitment into violent extremist groups in Indonesia, the need to intervene in this domain has become much apparent.
- ❖ **Livelihood activities need to be focused in specific geographic areas** i.e. part of area-based programming instead of being scattered around in many communities to make a larger impact.
- ❖ **Livelihood and income generating activities should focus on specific risk groups e.g. young people out of the formal education system for more than a few years without alternative skills for livelihood.** A recent portfolio level evaluation in Mali revealed that specific targeting can generate a far larger impact than targeting ‘youth’ or ‘women’ in general.

- ❖ **A risk/vulnerability reduction monitoring approach** is essential to better understand the longer-term impact of income generating activities and their relation to addressing the loss of livelihood.
- ❖ **Setting the definition of who is “at-risk” of violent extremism at the onset of the program is a critical component of design.** The question of who is at risk of violent extremism is a highly debated one without a consensus<sup>17</sup>. Nonetheless, having a clear definition at the inception of the programme relevant to every community and set by community leaders is essential for the conceptualisation and results measurement. It also forms the base for beneficiary selection, especially for activities that seek to target individuals like income generation activities. This definition should be multi-dimensional and context specific, with emphasis on the factors that predispose people into violent extremism.

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<sup>17</sup> Glazzard, A. and Zeuthen, M., 2014. Violent extremism. *Reading*. Violent-extremism\_RP.pdf (gsdrc.org)

## **4. Indonesian Portfolio Objectives**

- I. To support rehabilitation and reintegration of VE groups returnees and former detainees charged with extremism through building an enabling environment (policy framework and capacity building of frontline workers and community leaders)
- II. To promote community-based (re)integration for returnees and their families, bridging them with the host communities, through social cohesion and economic alternatives interventions
- III. To raise awareness against online and in-person radicalisation, promoting critical thinking and digital literacy in formal, informal, and religious educational institutions.
- IV. To enhance the expansion of the peace villages through support to female leaders at the community level
- V. To increase access to economic opportunities for daily labour workers, small traders, returning migrant workers, and people from vulnerable or stigmatised neighbourhoods

## Geographical Scope

Geographically, GCERF’s support will focus on the three provinces of Central Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, and Jakarta, in the following cities, regencies, sub-districts, villages<sup>18</sup> :

Province	Regency or City	Sub-Districts	Villages	
<b>Jakarta</b>	Jakarta (Handayani Rehabilitation Centre)	Cipayung	Bambu Apus	
<b>West Nusa Tenggara</b>	Bima Regency	Woha	Risa	
			Kalampa	
			Dadibou	
	Bima City	Asakota	Jatiwangi	
			Raba	Kendo
			Mpunda	Penatoi
	Mataram City	Mataram	Pagesangan	
			Sekarbela	Tanjung Karang
			Selaparang	Dasan Agung
	Lombok Barat Regency	Gerung	Gerung Selatan	
			Gerung Utara	
		Kediri	Kediri	
			Lembar	Lembar
	Lombok Timur Regency	Gunung Sari	Gunung Sari	
		Aikmel	Bagik Nyaka	
		Semalun	Semalun	
Suralaga		Suralaga		
Wanasaba		Bebidas		
<b>Central Sulawesi</b>	Poso	Poso Kota	Kayamanya village	
		Pamona	Tentena	
		Puselemba		
	Poso Pesisir	Taman Jeka		
		Tokorondo		
	Morowali	Bahodopi	Bahodopi	
Fatufia				


<sup>18</sup> Please See Annex 4: Levels of Indonesia Government to understand the distribution of the administrative subdivisions in the country.



### 1. Jakarta Province

The Handayani Rehabilitation Centre (Jakarta Regency) is managed by the Ministry of Social Affairs in collaboration with the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Indonesian Police Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror (Densus 88).

The Centre is the main rehabilitation centre in the country for individuals who are associated with FTTs and VE groups, in particular children and women. Its process is following a gradual approach:



The centre receives individuals who are associated with FTTs and VE groups, in particular children and women. Even though CSOs have been collaborating with the Centre, some gaps remain at various steps of the process. These gaps include continuous training of the social workers and social reintegration of those individuals to the communities, including the monitoring system. GCERF’s support will focus on supporting the three institutions in the Centre, as well as the efforts of reintegrating those individuals in their communities or origin or in the ones chosen for their reintegration.

### 2. West Nusa Tenggara (WNT):

In WNT and in Bima in particular, specific regional identity and religious traditions make the region a target for radical groups. Lowlander Bimanese are known for their fervent adherence to Islam and conservative traditions. Simultaneously, the Bimanese tradition of welcoming guests and outsiders without suspicion has helped create an environment which is hospitable for outside extremists. As such, the cultural nature of WNT may be seen as a driver at the regional level. Religious boarding schools (pesantren), including those that have been newly established, were reported vulnerable to the influence of VE groups. Fostering emotional closeness with young worshippers is a tactic employed by VE groups – taking advantage of those who otherwise feel marginalised or lacking a sense of belonging.

### 3. Central Sulawesi:

Jl had a training camp in Poso that was established in 2000. There was a large-scale communal conflict between Muslims and Christians from 1998 to 2000, officially ended by the signing of the Malino Declaration in 2001. During the conflict, several mujahideen from the island of Java came to Poso to fight on the Muslim side. Some of these groups included Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), which sent many of its members to fight in Poso to support the local Muslim community. Some of the narratives used by VE groups currently express grievances

against the Malino Declaration, claiming that it failed to provide justice, especially for the families of those who were killed. These VE groups are seeking retribution against the Christian community members, threatening peace in the area. There are several on-going P/CVE efforts attempting to address the situation, but there are still buffer zones that require community strengthening to prevent the expansion of radicalisation.

The most adequate interventions in the area seem to be community-based integration targeting former fighters. Organisations like The Habibie Center and Lembaga Penguatan Masyarakat Sipil Poso (LPMS) are currently implementing rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in Poso.

In South Sulawesi, around 100 former combatants and former terrorism convicts work at the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP). IMIP consists of more than 50 companies and employs approximately 10,000 people, with 10% being foreign workers from China and the rest being local workers from various regions in Indonesia. The potential for re-radicalisation of the former combatants and former terrorism convicts is largely driven by the issues at IMIP: the anger within the local community; tensions between locals and incoming migrant workers, land and business disputes; and the frequent accidents that often result in protests (IPAC, 2024).

According to the GCERF Country Needs Assessment, communities in these three regions are the most vulnerable to recruitment, socially, economically, and politically.

**Fig 1: Map of the areas of intervention**



## Demographic Focus

### 1) Youth between the ages of 15 and 30<sup>19</sup>

The GCERF-Commissioned Indonesia Country Needs Assessment report confirmed that VE recruiters typically targeted young people. The LSI survey<sup>20</sup> on attitudes towards VE found that younger respondents, especially those under 21, were more likely to support ‘violent extremist views’, and a large proportion were ambivalent in their responses (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2022, p.98).

A study conducted by BNPT in 2012 looking at 110 perpetrators of terrorism found that all were under 40 years old and most under 30 years old, with almost one in eight under 21 (11.8% were under 21, 47.3% were aged between 21–30, and the remaining 29.1% were aged between 31–40 years)<sup>21</sup>. Furthermore, Search for Common Ground’s (SFCG) study entitled ‘Working Together to Address Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Youth–Government Partnerships’, identifies the prevalence of youth in terrorist groups, noting that the majority of Jamaah Islamiyah members are male and young, and the average age of an ISIS recruit is around 26 years old<sup>22</sup>.

This demographic are frequent consumers of online media, and those who attend Islamic boarding schools and universities are more vulnerable to this approach because they live away from intervention by parents or their home community. They are also considered a challenging group to work with due to their high levels of mobility and shifting priorities – i.e. moving on to further education, need to find employment, or starting families (USAID and Harmoni 2023, p.19).

### 2) Educational institutions: University Students and Students in Religious Boarding Schools (Pesantren)

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<sup>19</sup> According to Indonesia’s 2009 Law No. 40 on Youth, young people are citizens aged 16–30 years. According to the National Census of 2010, there are 65 million young people in Indonesia, representing 28 percent of the total population of 238 million (UNFPA, Indonesian Youth in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Nicholas Goodwin & Irma Martam, [Indonesian Youth in the 21st Century \(Youth Mapping\).pdf \(unfpa.org\)](#), 2014). We are adding the 15–18 age group here to include teenagers at risk of recruitment

<sup>20</sup> National survey developed by LSI supported by Harmoni (USAID), Search for Common Ground & Love Frankie.

<sup>21</sup> G. Barton et al. (eds.), Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia, New Security Challenges, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4_6)

<sup>22</sup> Williams, M. (2016). *Working Together to Address Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Youth–Government Partnerships*. Prepared with Support from the U.S. Department, Williams, M. (2016). Working Together to Address Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Youth–Government Partnerships. Prepared with Support from the U.S. Department of State. Quoted in G. Barton et al. (eds.), Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia, New Security Challenges.

Educational institutions are targeted by VE groups. While the majority of the students are not receptive to their propaganda, a significant proportion is sensitive to their arguments and recruitment techniques.

The BNPT identified seven state universities in Indonesia considered to be exposed to radical ideologies (INFID 2018, p.1), including three in West Java, three in Central, and one in East Java. Campus radicalism was subsequently investigated by an INFID research report quoted in this study. VE groups are active and operational within staff and student bodies.

UNDP's CONVEY's Project show that young Muslims in Indonesia generally support open and moderate thinking and behaviour, and that until recently, the inclination of young people towards conservatism, radicalism, and extremism had been in decline. However, according to CONVEY's studies, there are two key enclaves—educational institutions and cyber media—that have been responsible for driving young people towards hard-line conservatism and radicalism (Convey Indonesia Project, 2018b)<sup>23</sup>.

Wahid Foundation's survey about the activists of Rohis and intra-school organisation (OSIS) at senior high school level showed that 60% of respondents were willing to go to jihad in the conflict area should the opportunity arise, and 86% of respondents supported perpetrators and acts of terrorism (Huda, 2017: 10–14)<sup>24</sup>.

In addition, over 96% of higher education institutions in Indonesia are privately run, making government intervention challenging (SFCG; Love Frankie 2018, p.31). New university students, especially those moving from rural to urban areas, are the principal targets because they are separated from their families, uncomfortable in new environments, and typically have more conservative backgrounds. Universities are currently included in P/CVE programmes, promoting inclusivity amongst academics and students (The Habibie Center 2018).

With regards to religious education institutions, some pesantren<sup>25</sup> in Central Java, West Java, and West Nusa Tenggara are considered particularly radical or are known to be associated with VE groups. In Central Java, often the students in *khuttab* (Islamic study groups) are targeted by extremist groups, especially where those groups are not registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag).

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<sup>23</sup> Peace Generation Indonesia & Convey Indonesia Project. (2018). *Boardgame for Peace 2017–2018 Program Report*. Peace Generation, PPIM UIN, and UNDP Indonesia. <https://peacegen.id/app/uploads/2019/06/FINALREPORT-BGFP.zip>. Quoted in G. Barton et al. (eds.), *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia*, New Security Challenges,

<sup>24</sup> Quoted in G. Barton et al. (eds.), *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia*, New Security Challenges.

<sup>25</sup> Islamic boarding schools

A significant contributing risk factor that has been identified here is that of religious education, with many young Muslim students not having access to religious education with a solid peace perspective in school (Suhadi, 2018: 60)<sup>26</sup>.

### **3) Remote, Isolated, Economically & Socially Vulnerable Groups (Unemployed males and females aged between 15 and 30)**

VE groups seek to take advantage of power vacuums and areas where they can operate without scrutiny or competition from the state or other organisations.

#### ***Economically vulnerable groups***

Economically vulnerable groups who are dissatisfied with and seemingly not benefiting from the current system might be open to outside influence or radical actions which promise change to the status quo and are more susceptible to the narratives used by extremist groups. Also, economic vulnerability often translates to experiencing difficulty in accessing educational opportunities, which ultimately leads to lower levels of education and increasing susceptibility to *amniyah* techniques (**Use of Financial Incentives**). For example, historically, poverty in the Bima region (especially rural areas) made the area fertile ground for ISIS recruitment. JAD predominantly targets individuals with lower to middle-level education engaged in occupations such as labour and trade. They target these individuals because they may face economic challenges and social vulnerabilities, making them more susceptible to recruitment by radical groups that exploit grievances and promise solutions. Furthermore, those engaged in occupations like labour and trade (especially small traders) may experience economic dissatisfaction, making them receptive to radical ideologies that offer a sense of purpose, identity, and potential economic or social change. One of BNPT's seven priorities for 2024, identified in the strategic plan, is to protect Indonesian migrant workers from VE recruitment (BNPT 2024). The plan mentions migrant workers from Indonesia radicalised in in some countries in the region, and this group is considered vulnerable because of their economic and social circumstances.

#### ***Rural & Geographically Isolated Communities***

Such vacuums are often located in geographically isolated and rural areas. The Country Needs Assessment reported that rural communities and small villages are increasingly becoming a focus for VE groups in WNT, following government crackdowns in the region. Remote or spread-out communities are sometimes chosen for refuge by suspected terrorists. Communities which are considered 'individualistic' or 'disconnected' (i.e. lacking in cohesion, social bonds and neighbourly interactions) are vulnerable as information about activities is not shared. For example: Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) seeks to establish influence

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<sup>26</sup> Quoted in G. Barton et al. (eds.), *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia*, New Security Challenges.

through villages and local systems of government (Rukun Tetangga and Rukun Warga). Rural communities also have high proportions of economically vulnerable individuals.

### ***Communities Isolated from Mainstream Religious Influence***

In Central Java, struggles over mosque management between outsiders and local groups occurs in areas where there are vacuums (i.e. if the religious communities or local authorities are not strong, there is nobody 'actively managing' the mosque), leaving space for VE groups to assert control. Such situations typically occur in rural areas far from administrative centres. The Indonesia Country Needs Assessment identified three specific communities in Solo<sup>27</sup> where such struggles have taken place. The presence of extremist groups controlling mosques 'inevitably influences the surrounding community'. Again, within the community, those who lack religious education or connections to mainstream religious organisations such as NU or Muhammadiyah are often targeted by extremist groups. Conversely, Muhammadiyah administrators at the sub-district and village levels are also targeted for influence by VE groups. Muhammadiyah is particularly vulnerable at the grassroots level, as VE groups seek to take advantage of competition both between and within mainstream religious groups.

In West Nusa Tenggara, the Needs Assessment report found that areas with reputations for radicalism, such as Penatoi, a sub-district in Bima City, are trapped in a 'vicious circle' whereby stigma isolates them from other communities and means that hard-line preachers proliferate over moderate ones. Many young people in Penatoi were reported to be part of jihadist or *takfiri*<sup>28</sup> groups.

### **4) Returnee, Former VE offenders and their Families**

Indonesian nationals who had travelled to join ISIS and are returning from the Middle East have begun to play roles in the most recent attacks in Indonesia (Temby 2020, p.1), Women and children are major cohorts in this group increasingly targeted for involvement, such as in recruitment and as perpetrators of terrorist acts. Returnees are typically processed through the Handayani Rehabilitation Centre in Jakarta, under the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Handayani Rehabilitation Center has been involved in deradicalisation and disengagement efforts for returnees and their families since 2016, even though the official mandate from the Ministry of Social Affairs was only regulated in 2019 through the Ministry of Social Affairs Regulations 26/2019 on the Juvenile Rehabilitation Programs. Children affected by terrorist networks are classified into the category of children needing special protection. Some of the programs implemented by BRSAMPK Handayani include Education, through a program named

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<sup>27</sup> See [Table 4](#) for details.

<sup>28</sup> A minority ideology which advocates violence against other Muslims declared to be unbelievers.

Handayani Special School for Emotions; the Psychosocial Therapy Program, which includes helping returnees and their families heal from experienced trauma; the Physical Therapy Program, which includes examinations and treatment for returnees and their families; the Livelihoods Therapy Program, which includes training for returnees and their families to have skills to support life after undergoing the rehabilitation process at Handayani; the Mental-Spiritual Therapy Program, which includes strengthening religious knowledge and discipline, in this context Handayani collaborates with several parties including BNPT and TNI; and the Social Advocacy Program, which includes supporting reintegration for returnees and ensuring that these returnees return to their respective regions.

The main challenge faced by Handayani in carrying out its duties is the lack of capacity of the Social Workers at Handayani. Currently, there are 30 Social Workers at Handayani, but only a third of them have ever received training in managing and assisting returnees and their families, while the rest have little or no prior experience on this issue. Several government and non-government organisations have conducted training for Social Workers at Handayani, but many of those Social Workers have retired or been reassigned to other units.

Concerns also exist about the current limitations in reintegration support. There is a fear that former convicts and returnees and their families will fail to disengage from terrorist networks or will become re-radicalised. The involvement of government and communities at the local level is imperative in terms of addressing the gap between rehabilitation and reintegration of these individuals. West and Central Java host the largest numbers of returnees in Indonesia (INFID 2020, p.9).

Charitable organisations sympathetic to, or even directly affiliated with, VE groups exert influence by collecting donations and providing financial support to the children and families of imprisoned terrorists and fighters (Temby 2020).

## **5) Female Community and Religious Leaders**

Indonesia's NAP-PCVE *Focus 1: Strengthening supporting data in the prevention of Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (preparedness)* includes an outcome 3.2 aiming to understanding "the position, impact and role of women". Its *Focus 3: To increase the effectiveness of campaigns to prevent violent extremism that leads to terrorism among vulnerable groups* includes a Strategy "to increase the role (participation) of youth leaders, religious leaders, traditional leaders, **women leaders**, mass media, and social media influencers in delivering messages to prevent Violent Extremism".

Similarly, BNPT and other line ministries and agencies in Indonesia, such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs are also promoting women's religious leader role in PVE at community level. VE groups frequently use religion to attract new recruits, sometimes influencing mosques



themselves. Research has demonstrated that high-school students that have been acquainted to Islam through extra-curricular religious instruction like **Rohis**<sup>29</sup> are more susceptible to develop militant religious beliefs.

Focus group participants reported to GCERF’s Country Needs Assessment that VE groups target youths frustrated by the lack of economic opportunity, using community mosques to disseminate narratives which suggest youths can improve their living conditions by practicing jihad and the ‘true teachings’ of Islam.

The International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) report of radicalism in campus mosques states that radicalisation occurs in universities through mentoring sessions and Qu’ran study groups. INFID also reports that women are playing increasingly important roles in the university recruitment processes – acting as mentors or spreading narratives through women-only da’wah (the act of invitation to Islam)<sup>30</sup>.

## **Programmatic Focus**

GCERF-funded programming in 22 other countries has shown the importance and effectiveness of CSO initiatives in PVE. However, such initiatives are often led by large, capital based CSOs and IGOs. Local CBOs do not take part in larger strategic conversations on PVE and often lack the thematic and operational capacity to be implementing partners of the governments’ PVE strategy. However, local CBOs have the most access and are trusted actors in the community who could have the largest sustainable impact.

GCERF will aim to **empower local CBOs** and build their capacity to work on PVE in a coordinated manner with government institutions.

GCERF-funded programmes will aim to:

- Identify CSOs based in the communities affected by terrorism.
- Develop a capacity assessment and building tool to evaluate, benchmark and track the progress of CSOs during the duration of the programme.
- Provide trainings to improve thematic knowledge on PVE.
- Provide trainings to improve operational capacity including on financial management, monitoring and evaluation, risk management, grant writing.

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<sup>29</sup> Convey Indonesia Project, 2018a. The word Rohis is a contraction of Rohani Islam—‘Islamic spirituality’— and refers to extra-curricular religious instruction. Quoted in G. Barton et al. (eds.), *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia, New Security Challenges*.

<sup>30</sup> INFID. 2018. *The Degree of Radicalism in Campus Mosques in 10 State Universities in Indonesia*.



- Set up a mentoring/on-the-job training scheme for more experienced CSOs to support small CBOs in their region of work.
- Ensure coordination with local government institutions and the larger strategic goals of the government of Indonesia.
- Support small CSOs in implementing PVE activities.

GCERF Strategy 2025 outlines four resilience factors: Social Cohesion, Community Agency, Access to Socio-economic Opportunities, and Individual Sense of Purpose. Resilient communities and individuals are not completely immune to violent extremism. However, resilience protects them from supporting the recruitment of individuals (children, youth, and others) into non state armed groups.

GCERF programmes in Indonesia will support the four resilience factors by supporting the rehabilitation and reintegration of VE groups, returnees, and former detainees through building an enabling environment, establishing a policy framework, and capacity building of frontline workers and community leaders.

**1. To support rehabilitation and reintegration of VE groups returnees and former detainees charged with extremism through building an enabling environment (policy framework and capacity building of frontline workers and community leaders)**

**Rehabilitation and Reintegration** Research has shown that Indonesia “faces a pressing need for rehabilitation programs”<sup>31</sup>. Reports mention a first wave of deportees in 2017, about 570 Indonesians deported from Turkey. Some of these nationals went through the rehabilitation programs that the BNPT and the C-SAVE (Civil Society Against Violent Extremism) Consortium managed.

In February 2020, the Indonesian government announced that it would not be allowing the repatriation of any of the approximately 700 Indonesians then detained in camps run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in north-east Syria, with the possible exception of children.<sup>32</sup>

With respect to Rehabilitation, returnees are typically processed through the Handayani Rehabilitation Centre in Jakarta, under the Ministry of Social Affairs. However, GCERF’s Country Needs Assessment<sup>33</sup> found concerns about limitations in reintegration support. Namely, there

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<sup>31</sup> G. Barton et al. (eds.), *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia*, New Security Challenges, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4_3).

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Indonesia Country Needs Assessment 2024, Nurai Global, commissioned by GCERF.

is a fear that former convicts will fail to disengage from terrorist networks or will become re-radicalised.

Building on GCERF expertise and experience in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia -- where GCERF supported the rehabilitation, resocialisation and reintegration of people affiliated with ISS -- GCERF, with support of civil society partners, can act as a trustworthy facilitator of similar support for the Indonesian returnees.

GCERF can also assist Indonesian citizens who are still in north-east Syria through pre-departure support. This may include expectation management, awareness raising about what is going to happen once the person returns to Indonesia and is admitted to the Rehabilitation Center, psychological assessment, language courses, and psychosocial support.

GCERF will also provide reintegration opportunities to those who are released from prison facilities and have been charged with the offense of extremism and terrorism. Here, GCERF will build on its experience and expertise in Kenya and Mali, while considering the necessary adaptations to the Indonesian context.

Focusing on youth and vulnerable populations can help the communities to build the resilience that is needed. Building social cohesion and providing socio-economic alternatives will also contribute to this objective. These processes would take place in close coordination with national and regional authorities.

GCERF is partnering with the National Counterterrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme or BNPT), the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. This collaboration, coupled with the ongoing development support from a variety of donors and UN agencies, provide the opportunity for GCERF to engage Indonesia's civil society organisations to provide a whole-of-society approach to the country's most pressing drivers of radicalisation.

The success of Densus 88 in Counterterrorism has led to more than 1,800 arrests in the past 19 years, with most sentences being between two and six years. Most detainees have been released, leaving a potential for a cycle of "recruitment, radicalisation, and recidivism" (Chalmers, 2017).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

The Handayani Rehabilitation Centre managed by the Ministry of Social Affairs in collaboration with the BNPT and Densus 88 has been the main facility addressing these de-radicalisation and rehabilitation needs<sup>35</sup>.

Among other institutions, the centre performs a comprehensive assessment of the detainees before designing a personalised intervention plan for each of them. The assessment covers the following areas:

- Physical
- Social
- Psychological
- Mental/Spiritual
- Background / Chronology
- Family Condition
- Level of Radicalisation
- Interests and talents

When it comes to R&R, GCERF and its partners in the Western Balkans have implemented a whole-of-society approach to Rehabilitation and Reintegration of returnees from Conflict areas (NES) since 2019. Working with returnees is a complex task and requires a case management-based approach tailored to the context in which the individual is returning. Current Programming is focused on four pillars<sup>36</sup>:

- 1. National:** Capacity building of central-level government R&R and PVE institutions and actors through technical support and training and facilitation of coordination.
- 2. Municipality:** Capacity building of local-level government R&R and PVE actors through the development of guidelines, provision of training, and facilitating coordination
- 3. Community:** Reducing the stigmatisation towards returnees, increasing interreligious and inter-ethnic tolerance, and building capacities of communities on PVE and early identification.
- 4. Individual:** Providing direct support to returnees and vulnerable people, including medical, psycho-social, educational, administrative, and livelihood support.

Drawing reference from the GCTF's Rome Memorandum of Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders and five years of experience of supporting its partners in R&R for more than 350 returnees, 1000 family members, and 132 frontline workers in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, GCERF has adopted the following good practice-based recommendations:

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<sup>35</sup> See page 16 hereabove, in the Geographic Focus section.

<sup>36</sup> GCERF Civil Society's Approach to Rehabilitation and Reintegration in the Western Balkans Global Action Platform

1. Utilising an integrative approach that combines **trauma-informed care and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT)** and involves engaging all psycho-social care providers to address the emotional, physical, and health needs of returnees. Essential collaboration with police officers, teachers, and social workers would ensure informed service delivery, based on the cultural backgrounds, lifestyles, and experiences of returnees, thereby fostering trust and effective support.
2. **Complementing religious counselling with trauma-informed and psychosocial care**, cooperating with religious organisations to carefully consider gender and background when selecting counsellors, and extending the scope beyond religious matters to include community engagement, gender issues, education, employment, and tolerance.
3. **Recognising the role of parents, family members, and other caregivers** in P/CVE and R&R, particularly empowering fathers and other male caregivers to avoid burdening only mothers by providing tools and support to empower them in supporting children and young people and assessing and mitigating potential risks to safeguard their physical and mental well-being.
4. **Collaborating with school administrators, teachers, and counsellors for cultural sensitisation** to better understand the needs and challenges faced by returnee women and children and offer them necessary support, while organising activities and events that promote social integration and cultural exchange to help returnees connect with their peers and build a sense of belonging within their communities.
5. **Developing policies that support vocational and educational training** for returnees and their families, alongside ensuring **access to legal and social services**.

The Handbook<sup>37</sup> developed by GCERF and the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation summarises the process as follows:

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<sup>37</sup> Handbook n°3: Rehabilitation from Violent Extremism and Radicalisation, ASSOCIATION OF CITIZENS “NEXUS – CIVIL CONCEPT” Skopje, Republic of North Macedonia, September 2022

Preparation (before Border)	Logistics (before Border)	Rehabilitation (after Border)	Reintegration & Resocialisation (in the community)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishing judicial and legal procedures</li> <li>Adopting national R&amp;R, CT &amp; P/CVE strategies and action plans</li> <li>Locating nationals in the camps</li> <li>Negotiating the return with camps authorities</li> <li>Establishing focal R&amp;R Coordination point</li> <li>Creation of Standard Operating Procedures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Moving of returnees from the Al Hol Camp to Al Roj</li> <li>Informing returnees of the repatriation process</li> <li>Repatriation to home country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In emergency reception centres and prisons</li> <li>Medical &amp; psychosocial examinations</li> <li>Identifying needs and initiation of case management</li> <li>Judicial proceedings</li> <li>Initial and psychosocial support in emergency reception centres and prisons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To returning FTFs, their families and receiving communities</li> <li>Direct support to returnees in their home communities</li> <li>Support to host communities</li> </ul>

GCERF would apply the good practices and recommendations when designing the Rehabilitation and Reintegration programmes in Indonesia, through the following approach:

**1. Developing and sustaining local capacities on R&R of former domestic VE fighters, Individuals associated with FTFs, and their families through:**

- Supporting the Preparation, Logistics, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration processes for Indonesian Returning individuals who are associated with Foreign Terrorist Fighters (RFTF), including identification of Indonesians in the Al Hawl and Al Roj camps in Syria through the collaboration with GCERF programmes in Syria;
- Capacity building of front-liners regarding the process and their role in R&R of Individuals associated with FTFs and their families. Front-liners include teachers, psychologists and psychiatrists, social workers, prison and probation staff, community policing officers, and local government staff. Capacity-building activities should include extensive, tailored, and certified training for:
  - Social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, frequent panic attacks, depression, sleep deprivation, and selective autism;
  - Teachers in schools and those graduating from the Faculty of Education in PVE and R&R of returned children;
  - Prisons and probation staff on R&R of prisoners convicted of terrorism;
- Capacity building on R&R for inter-institutional working groups, local community structures. These structures include *Rukun Tetangga* (neighbourhoods), *Rukun Warga* (hamlets), *Desa* (villages), *Kelurahan* (suburbs), *Forum Kewaspadaan Dini Masyarakat* (Early Awareness Forums), *Bintara Pembina Desa/Babinsa* and

- Bhayangkara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat/Bhabinkamtibmas* (Community Policing Officers), and Local Public Security Councils;
- Sensitising government institutions to the needs and grievances of returnees. Advice and preparation of policy reform might also be necessary through the revision of national or provincial reintegration strategies and associated plans; a thorough assessment of the challenges faced by domestic VE fighters, Individuals associated with FTFs, and their families, including their socio-economic, psychological, and reintegration needs; fostering coordination and collaboration between government agencies (at national, provincial, and local levels), civil society organisations, community leaders, and the beneficiaries (domestic VE fighters, Individuals associated with FTFs, and their families); and supporting monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of reintegration policies and programs. This includes regular feedback to assess the impact of interventions and make necessary adjustments;
  - Strengthening the role of central and local institutions in R&R process and long-term prevention of violent extremism through tailored training and advocacy actions. These institutions involve Local Government Agencies, Local Security Apparatus, Local CSOs (including religious-based organisations), the Private Sector, educational institutions, and religious universities. Examples of interventions identified for this purpose include: mobilising and strengthening capacities of religious universities to design a joint program on inter-religious dialogue; supporting educational institutions in integrating PVE in the school curricula; supporting PCVE institutions to reinforce online referral mechanisms; and developing capacities of central and local institutions to effectively monitor and evaluate the R&R process;
  - Supporting the research capacities of the BNPT on P/CVE and R&R.

**2. To promote community-based (re)integration for returnees and their families, bridging them with the host communities, through social cohesion and economic alternatives interventions**

The Country Needs Assessment establishes that the process of radicalisation conducive to VE is complex. GCERF funded programmes in Indonesia will aim to focus on a combination of primary and secondary prevention approaches with emphasis on relieving resilience stresses:

**Community-based R&R of FTFs and family members:**

- Psychosocial support to Individuals associated with FTFs and their families;

- Direct support to the reintegration of individuals who are associated with FTFs and their families by providing educational and vocational training, as well as income-generating activities;
- Increase the capacities of mothers and other custodian members to support returned children in their educational development;
- Community engagement activities to strengthen cohesion among Individuals associated with FTFs and their families and the receiving communities;
- Support pre and post penal reintegration programs for convicted Individuals associated with FTFs;
- Mobilise and increase the capacities of religious leaders to play a more active role in PVE R&R. Supporting inter and intra-community mediation of existing and emerging social, religious, and political conflicts;
- Support development of community-level preventive practices against radicalisation: Awareness and sensitisation sessions on radicalisation and organisation of cultural, artistic, and sports events (including art exhibitions or competitions on peace, sports tournaments, capacity-building for youth groups and local authorities, and provision of psychosocial support);
- Support tailored media communication outreach against radicalisation and VE: Community-level radio campaigns, street theatre, and sponsoring the production of music tracks promoting peace.

**Strengthen the role of Media in R&R and P/CVE:**

- Capacity building of media actors on R&R and P/CVE;
- Strengthening local voices to disseminate positive alternative narratives online;
- Building the capacities of central and local authorities in using technology and strategic communication in preventing and addressing online radicalisation.

**3. To raise awareness against online and in-person radicalisation, promote critical thinking and digital literacy in formal, informal, and religious educational institutions.**

The 2022 book *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia* has produced a comprehensive study of the online P/CVE Social Media efforts in the country. The book closely examined the results of censorship and negative measures like blocking and removing content before it appears online, reporting and takedowns, counter narratives, positive/alternative narratives, remedial interventions, Critical Thinking and Resilience, and gaps and challenges in online P/CVE<sup>38</sup>. Joining other publications on the topic, the book notes the impact of the *We Think Digital Initiative* launched by Facebook in 2019. This digital initiative partnered with five Indonesian CSOs from a variety of different social spaces: Do Something Indonesia, SiBerkreasi,

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.



Sudah Dong, YCAB Foundation, and PGRI. Each of these organisations brought their own unique, Indonesia-specific expert knowledge to the We Think Digital initiative, ranging from anti-bullying, peace through formal education, economic empowerment, and resilience against hoaxes and online radicalisation<sup>39</sup>.

Despite the wide usage of counter narrative techniques, research has shown that there is limited study of their effectiveness (Silverman et. al., 2016). Research demonstrates that practitioners need to carefully consider the most appropriate messenger for the target audience and the message being delivered. Counter narrative approaches informed by one form of Islamist extremism like as JI or AQ may not be effective in targeting other forms like IS. Consequently, specific tailoring is critically important to the effectiveness of such programmes.

Research also recommends increasing reactive mitigation efforts. Looking to recent developments in the remedial intervention space such as the counter conversations pilot conducted by ISD may provide a valuable addition to Indonesia's existing online P/CVE efforts.

Finally, it is critical to improve the understanding of the link between online and offline spaces when it comes to recruitment and radicalisation, as radicalisation rarely occurs without offline communication.

GCERF has experience in Digital PCVE, including in South and South-East Asia. From 2019 to 2024, GCERF's facilitated initiatives in Bangladesh, through partnerships among grantees and local and international organisations such as UNDP, have focused on strengthening digital literacy and critical thinking skills to combat VE by empowering youth to counter online threats such as VE messaging, fake news, and hate speech. A significant component of these initiatives was the creation and dissemination of educational content through various media, including the production of radio/podcast episodes addressing PVE issues. The youth were trained in digital media literacy and social media entrepreneurship, empowering them to create and disseminate positive content online and enhancing their resilience against online radicalisation. The youth platform established by the grantees created a country-wide online group fostering a digital community for youth engagement in PVE, which grew to over 10,000 members. The group facilitated the sharing of positive narratives and counter-narratives through posts, comments, and reactions, promoting a tolerant and cohesive society.

Between 2020 and 2024, GCERF supported CSOs and CBOs in the Philippines to focus on digital literacy and media production skills to counter misinformation and promote peace. Collaborating with local partners, GCERF facilitated the production of several online risk

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.



communication materials and online talk shows, providing platforms for discussing media literacy, combating misinformation, and promoting peace education. Training sessions for parents, educators, youth, women, children, religious leaders, and other community members focused on integrating peace education into the curriculum, fostering peaceful parenting styles, and enhancing storytelling skills for peacebuilding. In Mindanao, the "S'bang Ka" network emerged as a critical component, transforming community patrollers into reporters who produced and disseminated positive narratives through multimedia content. These efforts were followed by mentoring sessions, capacity-building workshops, and the production of local news segments that emphasised empathy, inclusivity, and cultural sensitivity, thereby reinforcing community resilience and cohesion.

GCERF is also an active partner of the Christchurch Call, a community of over 130 governments, online service providers, and civil society organisations acting together to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online<sup>40</sup>.

Building on its experience with Digital Literacy, GCERF will propose the following activities:

- Initiate partnerships and collaborations with local organisations and international bodies, in synergy with existing initiatives to address VE and misinformation.
- Develop and broadcast audio-visual content focusing on PVE and digital literacy through media and online campaigns.
- Launch or co-facilitate online platforms to engage youth and communities in positive discussions on countering hate speech and extremist narratives.
- Conduct training and capacity building on Digital Media Literacy and Social Media Entrepreneurship to recognise and combat misinformation and ensure the ethical use of digital media.
- Facilitate community actions and engagement by creating community clubs focused on peacebuilding and social cohesion.
- Implement mentoring programs for youth in developing positive narratives and engaging in social media entrepreneurship.
- Encourage the dissemination of positive narratives through various media, including posters, videos, and online content.

#### **4. To enhance the role of women in PCVE in promoting social cohesion resilience, through support to female leaders at the community level**

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<sup>40</sup> <https://www.christchurchcall.com/>

Indonesia is a multi-ethnic and multireligious country. VE are using the religious divisions or tensions among different communities to recruit. Therefore, the role of religious and traditional leaders is critical to prevent VE. Women have actively played roles as peacebuilders and peace activists in communal and social conflicts throughout Indonesia's history, including in PCVE efforts. Their involvement is crucial due to several factors, including their unique position within communities, their influence on family and educational structures, and their ability to provide alternative narratives to extremist ideologies. Many women-led PCVE activities occur in civil society, social, and religious settings. Although often "under the radar," these initiatives significantly impact community members' decisions to refrain from fundamentalist activities. One example is shown by *Kongres Ulama Perempuan Indonesia* (KUPI) - Indonesia Women's Ulama Congress, a movement that aims to increase the participation of Women Religious Leaders to address various social issues, including the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (PCVE). KUPI's activities have influenced national and local policies, particularly in areas related to women's rights and social justice. Their advocacy efforts have led to increased awareness and policy initiatives addressing issues like child marriage and domestic violence<sup>41</sup>.

In addition, the role of women traditional/community leaders is also significant for PCVE in Indonesia. For this purpose, a key initiative to promote women's leadership in PVE is the *Desa Damai* (Peace Villages) at the community level. The *Desa Damai* initiative aims to address the threats of radicalism by empowering communities at the village level, through strengthening social cohesion, community resilience, and promoting social equality and respect for diversity<sup>42</sup>. As part of this initiative, several groups of women are established and become peace agents. These women's groups also engage with village leaders to find ways to promote tolerance and maintain peace within their communities.

*Desa Damai* intentionally places women as key actors in building peace within family, community, and local government contexts. Women are involved in developing their skills to become economically self-reliant, actively participate in decision-making processes, and creatively shape narratives of peace.

By 2022, the *Desa Damai* initiative have been established in 20 villages across West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java and South Kalimantan<sup>43</sup>.

*Desa Damai* was originally an initiative of the Wahid Foundation and being acknowledged by the BNPT as one of their flagship programs. GCERF can support replicating the *Desa Damai* initiative in GCERF's focus areas of West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi.

GCERF funded programmes will aim to:

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<sup>41</sup> [Beranda - KUPI](#)

<sup>42</sup> <https://peacevillage.id/pages/desa-damai.id>

<sup>43</sup> <https://peacevillage.id/pages/desa-damai age.id>

- Support the existing or upcoming *Desa Damai* (Peace Villages) initiatives in Central Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara;
- Enhance the capacity of female community leaders to respond to radicalisation, including female faith leaders;
- Increase awareness in communities and among faith leaders of extremist’s threats and effective responses to the exploitation and misrepresentation of religious texts by VE;
- Increase the understanding of the socioeconomic factors pushing individuals to VE;
- Strengthen partnerships and coordination between relevant stakeholders to respond to radical ideology, appealing narratives and other inducements used by recruiters;
- Support interfaith networks which shall serve as a framework for continuous and sustainable dialogue, coordination and learning for faith leaders;
- Improve religious coexistence within multi-religious communities.

**5. To increase access to economic opportunities for daily labour workers, small traders, returning migrant workers, people from vulnerable or stigmatised neighbourhoods**

As the Country Needs Assessment established, VE recruitment puts a consistent emphasis on the predicament of youth in the province, faced with unemployment, lack of access to education, and poor quality of life.

GCERF’s support lifts barriers that limit access to social and economic opportunities and enables more community members to access opportunities. GCERF grantees will support positive social and economic alternatives in the focus communities by highlighting positive role models when possible and will collaborate and partner with specialised NGOs to provide:

- life skills training;
- professional skills training;
- psychosocial support;
- Connections between the youth and private sector job opportunities or private sector companies;
- long-term sustainable mentorship for micro enterprises;
- Support for the socio-economic insertion of vulnerable youth and communities;
- Support for equitable and gender-sensitive access to skills training and seed-funding.

The programmes can also propose referrals to existing programmes or services providing the same. The objective is to help young women and young men to help foster their sense of purpose and improve their ability to achieve their aspirations.

## **5. Theory of Change**

All grants funded under this strategy will be aligned with the Country-Level Theory of Change (ToC), which allows GCERF to evaluate the cumulative effect of its programming. All proposed grantee programming should be able to be reflected in the ToC and should use a selection of the country-level indicators included below.

### **Problem Statements**

Indonesia faces a complex social economic and political situation in relation to returnees (from Iraq, Conflict areas) and the challenge of rehabilitation and reintegrating them and homegrown offenders

Although R&R structures are being established, frontliners still need support to be able to respond adequately to the needs of both returnees and those released from incarceration facilities and previously charged with VE. Finally, to ensure that the problem does not repeat itself, there is a need for an enabling environment for R&R and preventing violent extremism. Beyond the issue regarding returnees and their families, Indonesia also faces threats regarding radicalisation due to social tension at community level, dissemination of violent extremist propaganda offline and online especially targeting the youth population, and economic marginalisation that render some individuals more vulnerable to VE groups recruitment.

### **Response:**

**IF** GCERF has a holistic approach towards rehabilitation and reintegration, supporting interventions at national and local levels (policy and capacity building for frontliners)

**IF** GCERF follows such a holistic approach also at the level of the community, supporting interventions that foster alternative economic alternatives and social cohesion for returnees and formers, their families, and the host communities,

**IF** GCERF supports interventions that craft and disseminate positive alternative narratives (offline and online) to youth in educational institutions

**IF** GCERF fosters interventions that put women as a central actor on P/CVE, fostering their leadership role at community level

**IF** GCERF funded programs provided economic sustainable alternatives to very targeted populations, that otherwise might be vulnerable to material incentives from violent extremist groups

**AND** the following assumptions hold true:

- GCERF is able to locate and fund credible and trustworthy civil society organisations that have the buy-in from local communities;
- GCERF continues to receive political support from the Government of Indonesia and other stakeholders to support programs on R&R and community-led PVE programmes;

- GCERF can enhance the role of local actors in service delivery in the PVE Rehabilitation and Community Based Integration space, filling an existing gap;
- GCERF and its grantees are able to gather support from frontline workers, educational staff, and the community on PVE and Rehabilitation and Community Based Integration;
- GCERF and its grantees are able to gather support from female leaders at the community and develop interventions that help them to develop and foster their leadership;
- GCERF and its grantees are able to develop narratives that resonate with youth population, offering a positive alternative instead of only countering the violent extremist agenda;
- GCERF and its supported interventions are able to offer a sustainable and relevant livelihood alternative to youth and women being reintegrated and to those at-risk;

**THEN,**

It will result in the following **outcomes**:

- Enhanced policy framework and capacity of frontline workers responsible for R&R both at national and local levels;
- Enhanced acceptance of community members towards returnees/ individuals who are associated with FTFs and their families, with the latter feeling a higher sense of belonging and hope in their future;
- Increased capacity of youth to critically engage with offline and online information and more positive attitudes towards opinions and people from different groups in society;
- Enhanced capacity of female leaders on P/CVE, with increased recognition from stakeholders regarding the role of women on peace and security (especially P/CVE);
- Enhanced access to income for vulnerable/targeted people.

**THEN**

It will result in the following impact:

- Communities and individuals (including those returning and formers) have increased resilience against violent extremist groups' recruitment and radicalisation in the targeted areas.

**Indicators**

Outcome Indicators/Metrics:

1. % of frontline workers with the capacity to deal with R&R of returnees/formers

2. % of institutional actors reporting better collaboration between the different institutions in the context of the prevention of violent extremism (which includes rehabilitation and reintegration) (disaggregated by sex)
3. % of returnees/formers who feel accepted by the community
4. % of returnees/formers who report a positive outlook for themselves
5. % of people engaged by the project on digital literacy with increased capacity to distinguish online misinformation
6. % of community actors (female leaders) targeted by the project who feel equipped to respond to the risks of violent extremism (Disaggregated by sex)
7. % of vulnerable individuals supported by the project who reported access to higher income due to the project

#### Output Indicators/Metrics

- 1) # of frontline workers dedicated to returnees trained on PVE and R&CBI
- 2) # of frontline practitioners trained on the referral and case management mechanisms and how to use them (Disaggregated by sex)
- 3) # of returnees/formers (and family members) supported through GCERF funding
- 4) # of female leaders trained on PVE
- 5) # of people trained in digital literacy and critical thinking skills
- 6) # of people supported by livelihood interventions

After the grant-making process is done and the first round of baseline data collection of the programmes is realised, the GCERF Secretariat plans to complement the country-level indicators with targets for GCERF to monitor and evaluate the achievement of its goals in the Indonesia portfolio.

## **6. Country Alignment and Coordination**

GCERF has been invited by the Government of Indonesia. GCERF will also cooperate with other relevant stakeholders, including international organisations, CSOs, and businesses in Indonesia. Some of them will be part of GCERF’s Country Support Mechanism created in January 2024.

GCERF’s programmes will align with and support Indonesia’s PCVE legislation.

### **Indonesia’s Legislation to prevent and counter terrorism**

#### **Law Number 5/2018 (Anti-Terrorism Law)**

Indonesia has been working on de-radicalisation and counterterrorism for the past two decades (since the Bali bombing) and significant achievements have been made. The government, through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and the National Counterterrorism Agency (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* or BNPT) established a specific prison in Sentul for a deradicalisation programme as early as 2014. In 2018, the government passed **Indonesian Terrorism Law Number 5**.

#### **Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021 on the 2020–2024 National Action Plan (NAP) for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism**

To follow up on the law and to strengthen prevention and counteraction, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo signed **Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021 on the 2020–2024 National Action Plan (NAP) for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism**. It aims to “deal with the drivers of Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism, namely (1) conducive conditions and structural context; and (2) the radicalisation process. Conducive conditions and structural context as driving factors include economic inequality, marginalisation and discrimination, poor governance, human rights violations and weak law enforcement, prolonged conflicts, and radicalisation within prisons”.

The NAP also defines Violent Extremism: “Violent extremism that Leads to Terrorism can be interpreted as beliefs and/or actions that use violent means or threats of extreme violence with the aim of supporting or committing acts of terrorism”.

Indonesia is a pioneer for de-radicalisation activities across Southeast Asia.

The NAP includes three pillars:

- Prevention;
- Law enforcement (including witness and victim protection and strengthening of the national legislative framework);

- International partnership and cooperation.

The national plan considers “human rights principles; rule of law and justice; gender mainstreaming and fulfilment of children’s rights; security and safety; good governance; participation of multi-stakeholders; as well as diversity and local wisdom”.

Some provinces also have Regional Action Plans (RAD-PE). GCERF will align with provincial authorities to coordinate with their regional plans.

### **Coordination with national and international stakeholders**

GCERF will coordinate with the donor community and other agencies such as UNODC, UNOCT, UN Women, UNHCR, IOM, ICRC, and USAID, among others.

GCERF will align its work with the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021 on the 2020–2024 National Action Plan (NAP) for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism<sup>44</sup>.

GCERF will also proactively call for regular meetings among international and national stakeholders to share updates, good practices, and lessons learned from its investment in person or online.

GCERF’s national level primary partners are the following:

- **Task Forces and agencies:** BNPT, Indonesian Police’s Special Detachment 88 (Anti-terror), Handayani Centre (Under the Ministry of Social Affairs)
- **Ministries & agencies included in the RAN-PE joint secretariat:**
  - Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs
  - Ministry of Social Affairs
  - Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture
  - Ministry of Regional Development Planning/Bappenas
  - Ministry of Home Affairs
  - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  - Ministry of Religious Affairs

Indonesia is an immense unitary state. Therefore, it is essential to identify and coordinate with each provincial-level authorities, as well as with the relevant regencies, cities or village authorities.

These may include the following authorities involved in PCVE:

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<sup>44</sup> Please see Page 12 hereabove



- Provincial and Municipality/City Government, and its relevant agencies (Politics and Community Protection Agency – *Kesbangpol*, Women Empowerment and Family Planning Agency, Social Affairs Agency, etc)
- Regional Police Force – *Kepolisian Daerah* (Provincial)
- Resort Police Force – *Kepolisian Resor* (Municipality and City)
- Sectoral Police Force – *Kepolisian Sektor* (Sub-District)
- Army Regional Command – *Komando Daerah Militer* (Provincial)
- Army District Command – *Komando Distrik Militer* (Municipality and City)
- Army Sub-District Command – *Komando Rayon Militer* (Sub-District)
- Terrorism and Prevention Coordination Forum (FKPT)

Several forums are also gathering PCVE stakeholders, including government bodies, donor country representatives, CSOs, and Academia. These forums include, among others:

- Thematic Working Group of the NAP-PCVE
- Knowledge-Hub PVE Community
- Working Group of Women on PCVE
- Provincial-level Multistakeholder Forum and Working Group of Deradicalisation

Moreover, CSOs are playing a very active role in PCVE, especially the smallest ones at the grassroots level. Numerous national-level organisations and think tanks are well known for their PCVE programmes, like the Habibie Centre and the Wahid Foundation.

GCERF will coordinate with all these stakeholders to avoid duplication and competition. GCERF will strive to complement existing interventions and to focus on addressing gaps.

A **National Advisor** assigned to Indonesia will strengthen the coordination and consultations with the government entities and in-country stakeholders.

## 7. Funding and Investment Phases

**Table 1: Investment phases**

Phases	Level of Funding	Geographic Location	Interventions <sup>45</sup>	Population Groups
<b>Phase 1</b> GCERF plans to invest <b>up to USD 3m</b> in 2024 as it is looking for additional resources; focus on objectives 1, 2, and 3	Up to USD 3 million	Central Sulawesi; West Nusa Tenggara; Jakarta	a) Strengthening Rehabilitation and Reintegration (RR) as well as Social Reintegration capacities, including case management and Community-Based Integration, for individuals associated with terrorism. b) Supporting community-level interventions to improve active dialogue and conflict mediation among different communities and actors as a preventative approach to radicalisation and violent extremism, including in educational institutions c) Fostering sustainable livelihoods for communities, individuals, and marginalised groups, including among the Returnees & Former VE offenders and their families (Males and Females) d) Strengthening Digital Literacy and Critical Thinking Skills to provide counter-narratives and positive alternative messaging, including to Educational Institutions youth leaders	1. Youth between the ages of 15 and 30 (Males and Females) 2. Returnees & Former VE offenders and their families (Males and Females), including Returnee children, youth, and women 3. Educational institutions: University Students and Students in Islamic Boarding Schools (Pesantren)

<sup>45</sup> Please see the Programmatic focus section for the detail of proposed activities.

Phases	Level of Funding	Geographic Location	Interventions <sup>45</sup>	Population Groups
			<p>e) Providing capacity strengthening to frontline workers in the rehabilitation centre</p> <p>f) Sensitising local authorities and community influencers about the importance of accepting returnees and PVE</p> <p>g) Providing social and economic support to at-risk and vulnerable youth in communities of return</p> <p>h) Providing capacity building activities such as P/CVE training courses to all relevant stakeholders, including CSOs, Local or national authorities, Youth leaders</p> <p>i) Providing training and psycho-social support to the frontline workers</p>	
<p><b>Phase 2</b> Expansion of scope to Objectives 4 and 5 of the portfolio</p>	Up to USD 5 million	Central Sulawesi; West Nusa Tenggara; Jakarta	<p><b>Activities of Phase 1, as well as the following activities:</b></p> <p>a) Providing support to female community and female religious leaders, including strengthening <i>Desa Damai</i> (Peace Villages)</p> <p>b) Connecting the youth with private sector job opportunities and with private sector companies</p> <p>c) Long-term sustainable mentorship for micro enterprises</p> <p>d) Supporting the socio-economic insertion of vulnerable youth and communities.</p> <p>e) Supporting equitable and gender-sensitive access to skills training and seed-funding.</p>	<p><b>4. Population groups of Phase 1, as well as the following additional population groups:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Female community and Religious leaders</li> <li>•Unemployed males and females living in Remote, Isolated, Economically &amp; Socially Vulnerable areas aged between 15 and 30</li> </ul>

Phases	Level of Funding	Geographic Location	Interventions <sup>45</sup>	Population Groups
			f) Supporting returnee women with meaningful livelihood opportunities g) Providing social and economic support to at-risk and vulnerable youth	
<b>Scenario 3</b> Geographical expansion to additional provinces (in Sumatra) covering activities for Objectives 1, 2, and 3	Up to USD 7 million	Central Sulawesi; West Nusa Tenggara; Jakarta; Sumatra	Activities of Phase 1	•Population groups from Phases 1 and 2 combined

## **8. Capacity Building, Learning and Sustainability**

### **Tailored Capacity Building for Local CSOs**

Capacity building of local CSOs and existing community structures will be a key aspect of upcoming GCERF funded programmes. A capacity assessment and building tool will be developed to evaluate the current capacities of CSOs and community structures and provide them with tailored trainings and on the job support. GCERF plans to collaborate with the members of the international community such as the EU, USAID, and FCDO to assess current capacities and develop a capacity building tool. The capacity building assessment is an ongoing process. GCERF will review the quarterly narrative and financial reports of grantees and the quarterly monitoring visits of the advisor to assess progress.

### **Thematic and Technical Trainings**

GCERF will facilitate capacity building for its grantees and sub-grantees by linking global, regional, and national experts to local practitioners and actors in interactive workshops. Trainings will cover both thematic and technical topics. Depending on grantee need, these topics can include communications, security and risk analysis and mitigation, programme management, finance and compliance, and monitoring and evaluation, as well as thematic trainings such as psycho-social support for rehabilitation and CBI. GCERF will also roll out a digital literacy in P/CVE training programme that will be made available to grantees in Indonesia.

GCERF will plan to offer grantees in Indonesia at least 2-3 thematic trainings during their first year of implementation. Given the lack of focus on Prevention of Violent Extremism, GCERF will likely start off grantees with some general training on PVE, conflict sensitivity, and gender inclusivity.

### **Global and Thematic Knowledge Sharing**

In addition to trainings, GCERF also organises global and thematic **Communities of Practice** (CoPs) where GCERF partners from the region will meet either online or in person to share challenges, lessons learned, and good practices. CoPs sometimes take the form of trainings as mentioned above or are more reflective workshops to learn from and build on each other's work in the region or on a particular theme.

In the case of Indonesia, GCERF will also organise communities of practice with countries from the Western Balkans and possibly Iraq where similar issues are being financed by GCERF to share experiences and expertise for example about rehabilitation and reintegration.

In addition, GCERF at the global level organises quarterly virtual Global Communities of Practice. GCERF invites all grantees and other stakeholders to attend its Global CoPs which allow grantees from around the world to share insights, raise challenges and suggest solutions to common problems related to VE.

The Global Action Platform (GAP) has also launched working groups to connect its grantees and sub-grantees across the world on the topics of livelihood support, rehabilitation, community-based integration, and social cohesion.

Indonesia grantees will join Bangladesh, Philippines, and Sri Lanka grantees in the Digital PVE Working Group of the Global Action Platform.

GCERF's Independent Review Panel, a group of P/CVE practitioners and experts from around the world, supports the Secretariat with proposal review, learning events, and capacity strengthening of partners. The IRP Chair also serves as a member of GCERF's Governing Board. The IRP supports the grant making review process to ensure quality, impact, value for money, and alignment with national strategies and provides direct support to CSM members and grantees through structured inputs and capacity building.

### **Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning**

GCERF's work is anchored in evidence and good practice, but GCERF recognises the complexity of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) in the P/CVE context. GCERF's approach to monitoring results, program evaluation, and learning is guided by inclusivity, context-relevant knowledge, and evidence-driven adaptive management. GCERF therefore continuously develops its M&E systems to best suit its grantees' programming thematic and desired results.

GCERF grantees in Indonesia will develop strong M&E systems relevant to GCERF-supported grants. Principal Recipients (PR) that work in consortia will be responsible for establishing an M&E framework that includes sub-recipients, monitoring and evaluation of the activities, and reporting to GCERF on the aggregated results. The PR will also provide qualitative insights on progress through regular quarterly reports.

GCERF provides dedicated support to PRs in M&E through M&E design guidelines, ongoing support throughout grant development and management, as well as in-country visits by the National Advisor, the central Asia Regional Advisor, and the GCERF Secretariat including the Performance and Impact Specialist.

The core elements that GCERF supports its PRs with are the development of:

1. Theory of Change in line with GCERF's Strategy for Investment: During grant making, all grants will receive guidance to develop a theory of change in line with the local needs and the priorities set under this strategy;

2. Results Framework (RF) including Outcome and Output design and indicator development: In defining areas results areas for measurement, GCERF will co-develop the results framework with selected grantees. This will be at both the output and outcome levels. Selected grantees will have some of the standard indicators incorporated into their respective results framework (as appropriate with the program);
3. Data collection and analysis plans to produce RF indicator values;
4. Guidance on outcome assessment for outcome indicator measurement to support claims of project/grant achievements.

During Grant Management, the following take place:

1. Baseline Assessment: Program implementation will be preceded by a comprehensive baseline assessment. Grantees will be supported to employ robust assessments.
2. Capacity Building: At the heart of GCERF's approach is strengthening capacity, which is based on grantees' needs. This will be one of the key activities during the grant management period. Through these, it is expected that the grantees will have increased capacity to define measures of success, collect quality data to assess performance and programmatically adapt their approach whenever needed.
3. Third party monitoring: To verify the effectiveness and quality of activities implemented by grantees, GCERF will commission independent third-party monitors for selected activities of the different grants.

By the end of grants, GCERF ensures that the following are implemented:

1. Endline assessment: The end of each grant will be preceded by an endline assessment. This assessment will mainly be conducted by the grantees with technical support from GCERF. It will focus on assessing progress made in relation to indicators set at baseline.
2. Independent Evaluation: Following the end of grant endline assessments, GCERF will select one or more grants to be evaluated, and will commission an independent country level criteria-based evaluation to assess the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of grants.
3. GCERF's current approach to grant financial management includes: a clear set of financial management guidelines and templates that are regularly updated to respond to lessons learned and changes in the grantee environment; a periodic assessment of financial risks, including the risk of loss or misuse, at grantee and GCERF levels; and clear processes to support the grantees in the planning and management of programme budgets and cash resources and the improvement of their internal control systems (including regular monitoring visits and financial spot-checks). Annual financial audits (named financial examinations but include quality programmatic data controls) are conducted by an external audit firm retained by GCERF. GCERF uses every opportunity to meet with grantees during grant development and during the life of the grant, to enhance the capacity of grantees to manage GCERF funds.

The different GCERF teams work closely to ensure that these four elements are developed with prospective grant recipients and are contained within their narrative proposal submission and subsequent grant documents.

Lessons learned from this investment in Indonesia will be shared with the wider programming community and will serve as a basis for future P/CVE programmes and any subsequent rounds of investment.

Furthermore, the Country Level of Theory of Change its subsequent outcomes, and indicators will be the overarching framework for all investments in Indonesia. Grantees will be required to design grants in line with the defined outcome areas and report under a selected number of indicators from this strategy that link to the activities, outputs, and outcomes of their proposed programmes.

Building on the capacity building section above, GCERF will monitor grants and provide capacity support through the following approaches:

1. Quarterly, quantitative monitoring of grant activities by the national advisor
2. Bi-Annual, qualitative monitoring visits by the Secretariat
3. Quarterly review of narrative and financial reports prepared by grantees
4. Third Party grant monitoring
5. Annual external financial examinations of each grant

## **Timeline**

The timeline for implementation is December 2023 through December 2028. This will allow GCERF between three and four years of investment.

### **ANNEX 2 Indonesia Strategy Summary**

### **ANNEX 3 Summary of the Country Needs Assessment**

### **ANNEX 4 Violent Extremism Drivers in Indonesia**

### **ANNEX 5 Indonesia's Levels of Government**

### **ANNEX 6 Risks and Mitigation Measures**